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Informal Savings Groups in South 
Africa: Investing in Social Capital 
Abstract  
Informal savings groups (ISGs) provide an important means of consolidating 
financial resources in poor communities. However, this paper takes the view 
that the benefits to participation extend beyond conventional economic gains, 
and membership decisions should thus be viewed in the broader context of the 
joint accumulation of social and financial capital. The introductory section 
reviews the existing social capital literature and contextualises the work of 
Uhlaner (1989) on relational goods in this framework. The importance of social 
capital in establishing informal social security networks and systems of mutual 
insurance is highlighted, with a particular focus on the division of social 
responsibilities as a root cause for the differential formation of these networks 
by gender. As yet, there has been no systematic study of the role and functioning 
of ISGs, with the existing literature predominantly in the form of case studies. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the view that holds stokvels and ISGs as 
synonymous is inaccurate. This contributes to the considerable inadequacy of 
existing datasets for drawing reliable conclusions on savings behaviour. As a 
consequence, this paper is qualitative in its approach, using the social capital 
paradigm developed previously together with information gathered from a focus 
group to construct an expanded understanding of why these groups continue to 
flourish alongside formal financial institutions.  
Introduction 
Conventional wisdom holds that ‘stokvels’ or informal savings groups (ISGs) 
are simply a means for the poor to mobilise financial resources in the absence of 
developed financial markets. Given the large volume of informal savings 
generated annually by ISGs - the Unilever Institute (2003) estimates this figure 
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at R5.61 billion1 - the financial aspect of these associations is undoubtedly 
significant. However, in the South African context, this focus overlooks an 
important question: why do they continue to persist alongside a sophisticated 
formal financial sector? This paper addresses this issue, arguing that the non-
pecuniary returns to participation in the form of social capital are perceived by 
those who choose to participate as in excess of the lost interest that members 
may sacrifice by not banking their funds.  
The first section reviews the existing social capital literature and contextualises 
the work of Uhlaner (1989) on relational goods in this framework. The 
importance of social capital in establishing informal social security networks 
and systems of mutual insurance is highlighted. A broad classification of stokvel 
types is considered before outlining the reasons conventionally cited for 
participation. The social capital paradigm is then applied to construct an 
expanded understanding of why these groups continue to flourish alongside 
formal financial institutions. A simple model of savings decisions is developed 
to consider the impact of excessive bank charges, financial illiteracy and the 
value added by social interaction. ISGs are argued to be a particularly important 
form of social support for women. Evidence for the preceding theoretical 
analysis is provided by the results of a focus group conducted with an ISG group 
from Khayalitsha, discussed in the final section. 
An Overview of Social Capital Theory 
A commonly accepted view of capital is any asset capable of producing income 
(Bannock, Baxter and Davis 1992:56). While this definition is appropriate 
within traditional microeconomic theory which holds income as a useful proxy 
for welfare, it is somewhat limiting in a framework that regards the 
maximisation of well-being rather than simply income or wealth as its ultimate 
objective. It is the contention of this paper that in order to adequately understand 
individual behaviour, it is necessary to invoke this broader conceptual paradigm. 
As such, capital is perhaps better understood as a productive resource that is 
acquired as a consequence of investment. 
                                                 
1 This is noted as a conservative assessment in light of other studies that have suggested this 
amount to be in excess of R20 billion, not entirely implausible given estimates that almost 
every second black adult in South Africa participates in an informal savings scheme (Unilever 
Institute 2003), and savings propensity is high amongst stokvel members (Verhoef calculates 
average savings rates at 10% of income (2001b:535)). 
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While physical capital is embedded in tangible objects and human capital within 
actors themselves, ‘social capital refers to the connections among individuals – 
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them’ (Putnam 2000:19). However, Putnam’s definition is but one of a 
multiplicity. His conception is frequently criticised for being too narrow, given 
his assertion in earlier work that it is applicable only in horizontal networks (in 
which power is equally distributed between actors) and not in vertical 
(hierarchical) networks (Grootaert 1998:2). 
The intangible nature of social capital has given rise to the suggestion that it 
should be understood as the social component of human capital. Glaeser, 
Laibson and Sacerdote  interpret individual social capital as ‘a person’s social 
characteristics – including social skills, charisma and the size of his Rolodex – 
which enables him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with 
others’ (2001:4). However, such a classification is not entirely accurate either: 
while the benefits of social capital may be experienced at the individual level, it 
is not an individual-level attribute, as production and consumption require 
interaction between two or more agents.  
Coleman, often identified as the ‘father’ of social capital theory, offers a broad 
interpretation of social capital as a type of resource available to an economic 
actor through her relationship with others, and defined by its function:  
It is not a single entity but a variety of entities with two elements in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they 
facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal of corporate 
actors – within the structure (1988:98).  
Aside from being somewhat vague, this all-encompassing approach ironically 
restricts analysis considerably: it captures almost all elements of social 
interaction and thus allows little scope for the possibility that the production or 
use of certain ‘social goods’ such as friendship or trust (see the discussion on 
relational goods below) is actually facilitated by social capital rather than 
constituting a component thereof.  
Drawing on elements of these definitions, social capital in the context of this 
paper is understood as social networks formed as a result of the relationship 
between two or more people, as well as the norms that define the structure of 
these interpersonal interactions. This implies that social capital provides the 
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means by which social resources such as trust become accessible to individuals. 
A pipe may serve as a conduit for water, oil and a number of other substances, 
many of which prove valuable as goods in their own right or in turn are 
important inputs in other production processes. Networks of social capital may 
be understood in this light but with one important distinction: they may be 
wholly or in part responsible for the creation of those resources that are 
conveyed through their channels.2 
Networks also play a significant role in reducing the costs associated with 
acquiring information, and thus promote efficiency. While the production of 
information does not necessarily require interaction, channels of social capital 
provide an important means for its dissemination, from the recipe for a good 
cake to the recommendation of a reliable electrician or news of a job opening at 
a local factory. In some situations, networks may also be an input in the 
information creation process. This is perhaps most clear in the case of 
reputation, where production requires repeated interpersonal exchanges across 
social networks. 
Putnam distinguishes two key dimensions along which social capital formation 
occurs: ‘bridging’ (inclusive) and ‘bonding’ (exclusive). Bridging social capital 
is outward-focused, tending to unite people across diverse social cleavages and 
promoting information diffusion and linkages to external assets such as job 
opportunities. Conversely, bonding social capital is introspective and reinforces 
exclusive groupings, allowing for the mobilisation of solidarity (2000:22-23).    
The formation of these networks cannot be achieved through normal methods of 
individual investment argue Antoci, Sacco and Vanin, since many of the 
benefits of social capital are not privately appropriable (2002:3). However, this 
allusion to social capital as a public good is somewhat misleading: since by 
definition social capital requires interaction, returns cannot technically be 
captured by an isolated individual, but experiencing any significant benefits is 
contingent upon a degree of personal investment. As such, social capital should 
not be viewed as a public good, but rather, as Dasgupta (in Fukuyama (1999)) 
argues, a private good that is subject to both positive and negative externalities. 
                                                 
2 This alleviates much of the chicken-and-egg problem inherent in such definitions; for 
example, while it is possible that the pre-existence of trust between a group of individuals 
may result in the formation of a formal network (such as a savings club), this trust could only 
have been recognised and employed as a useful resource when expressed through some 
formal or informal connection (for example if the individual members work together). This 




Social capital may thus be over- or under-produced, but individual incentives to 
expend resources in its creation are certainly present. 
The Theory of Relational Goods 
In keeping with the objective of extending cost-benefit analysis beyond 
monetary terms, the relational goods model outlined by Uhlaner (1989) is of 
particular relevance in allowing for the examination of social psychology in an 
economic framework. This paradigm provides a useful starting point for 
meaningful discussion of ‘investment’ in social capital. Relational goods such as 
friendship or social approval are dependent on reciprocity in interpersonal 
interactions, and cannot be acquired by an isolated individual:  
these goods arise as a function of a relationship with others. The 
relational goods can only be ‘possessed’ by mutual agreement that 
they exist after appropriate joint actions have been taken by a person 
and non-arbitrary others … The identity of the ‘other’ in the 
relationship matters (ibid: 254). 
For a good of this nature, utility is a positive function of both personal 
consumption and consumption by others.3 This makes classification on a public-
private goods continuum difficult – individuals have an incentive to participate 
in the production of relational goods since enjoying their benefits requires 
interaction, and more than non-rivalrous, consumption is in fact (increasingly) 
jointly beneficial. Production and consumption of relational goods are frequently 
indistinguishable (Antocci, Sacco and Vanin 2002:3).4 Defining states like 
friendship in Uhlaner’s framework highlights their importance as an end rather 
than simply a means to achieve some other outcome or the by-product of an 
alternative economic process. 
                                                 
3 In this sense, the relational goods model bears some similarity to models that attempt to map 
utility functions as interdependent. 
4 Corneo and Jeanne’s (1999:711-712) discussion of ‘socially provided private goods’ – 
‘goods that are directly obtained by people from their social environment’ rather than traded 




An examination of trust as a relational good is particularly pertinent in the 
context of the broader focus of this study. Following Dasgupta, trust is viewed 
here in the context of, ‘someone forming expectations about those actions of 
others which have a bearing on her choice of action, when that action must be 
chosen before she can observe the actions of those others’ (2002:8). It 
essentially involves an evaluation of the character and incentives of another 
during a decision-making process. 
Some authors including Putnam (2000) consider trust a norm, which suggests it 
should be regarded as a part of social capital under the given definition. 
However, a norm is understood here as a generally recognised standard of 
behaviour, and since trust is not a directly behavioural quality, it cannot be 
viewed as such. To qualify this perspective: excluding trust as a form of social 
capital does not overlook its much-vaunted value as a resource, but rather seeks 
to highlight how norms are important in the strengthening of bonds of trust, and 
networks are important for its distribution.  
Many accounts show trust to be rational based on the importance of building and 
preserving a reputation in repeated interactions (see, for example, Good 1988), 
however the relational goods model suggests that attaining the trust of others 
may in part be an end in itself rather than simply a means to ensure a smoothly 
operating market. Whatever the rationale, trust and reputation play an important 
role in counteracting moral hazard in informal credit markets. While the absence 
of collateral in most poor households exacerbates the problems of imperfect 
credit markets (Dasgupta 1995:153), the trust inherent in family and community 
networks limits the extent of this problem by providing clearer information than 
would be available to the formal lending sector as to the reliability of potential 
creditors and the level of risk involved with their projects.5  
Social Capital as a Vehicle for Mutual Insurance 
Where risks are relatively independent across households (as in the case of death 
and some illness), mutual insurance or informal risk-pooling provides a degree 
of protection against unexpected contingencies. In considering the importance of 
                                                 
5 There is considerable work in the micro-credit/group-lending field to suggest that the 
success of projects relies on the trust and information inherent in some social networks to 




mutual obligation inherent in networks, Putnam distinguishes between specific 
and generalised reciprocity. The former refers to cases where a proportional and 
conditional joint commitment exists between two or more individuals; a case of 
‘I’ll do this for you if you do that for me.’ Generalised reciprocity is 
unconditional assistance offered by an individual on the understanding that 
should the need arise, similar aid would be offered in return (2000:21-22). 
Dasgupta highlights the importance of this norm in traditional agricultural 
villages: 
You come and help in my field when I fall ill, fully expecting that you 
in turn will be helped by me should you fall ill. Should it happen that 
you are ill longer than I was when you helped me, I would not cut 
short my help to keep it commensurate with the help you gave me. 
This is because, for all I know, the next time I may be ill for an even 
longer spell and will need more help from you (1993:208). 
The success of mutual insurance based on a norm of generalised reciprocity 
relies heavily on trust, as mutual assistance without threat of punishment for 
deviation from the agreement may provide an incentive for one or both parties to 
renege on their commitment. Adverse selection is a well-documented source of 
potential failure in conventional insurance markets, and is theoretically no less 
so in social insurance settings, since situations of asymmetric information imply 
that an individual cannot know with certainty how friends or family will actually 
react in a time of need. Trust again serves as a means to mitigate this risk. The 
threat of punishment for contravening the relatively loose understanding implicit 
in informal mutual insurance arrangements includes social sanction and the loss 
of reputation, with networks of social interaction providing the means by which 
information about an individual’s reputation may be rapidly disseminated. 
Social Capital, Gender and Social Security 
While there is a substantial literature on the individual fields of social capital 
and gender in economics, relatively little work has been done in examining their 
interaction. In light of experimental studies which find that women have greater 
regard for others and are more effective in applying social sanctions to elicit 
cooperation, it is unsurprising that they generally function better in groups than 
men (Barr and Kinsey 2002). This conclusion has further support from Eckel 
and Grossman (1998) who find that women are less selfish than men. It is 
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difficult to ascertain whether this results from a relative preference of women for 
the consumption of relational goods, or differential internalisation of certain 
norms of behaviour that allow for greater efficiency in the production of social 
capital. 
In a review of existing literature on social capital inequalities, Lin (2000) 
observes that the types and distribution of this resource vary by gender. 
Although both men and women are typically involved in a similar number of 
social groups, men are more likely to participate in large organisations with 
economic links, while women tend to associate in smaller organisations 
focussed on domestic and community affairs. Women’s networks also present a 
far greater diversity and concentration of kin ties. 
Findings of this nature have generally been used in support of the hypothesis 
that women are substantially disadvantaged in the job market due to relatively 
limited commercial and professional ties; ‘women’s social capital’ is often not 
associated with the traditional ‘economic’ benefits conferred by links in the 
spheres of business and politics. While this provides valuable insight and 
undoubtedly serves as an illustration of one manner in which labour market 
disadvantage is perpetuated, the perspective it presents is decidedly narrower 
than demanded by a holistic approach to welfare.  
In many senses, differential social capital networks should be seen as a symptom 
rather than source of inequality. An alternative view recognises the importance 
of women’s attempts to acquire resources that serve as a form of social security. 
With limited time, energy and money to spend on productive activities, social 
capital may be regarded as an important investment in household well-being by 
expanding the social safety net.  Broadly defined, social security may be viewed 
as:  
any kind of collective measures or activities designed to ensure that 
members of society meet their basic needs (such as adequate nutrition, 
shelter, health care and clean water supply), as well as being protected 
from contingencies (such as illness, disability, death, unemployment 
and old age) to enable them to maintain a standard of living consistent 
with social norms (Getubig 1992, in van Ginneken 1996). 
This understanding encompasses both formal and informal social safety nets. 
Women are often excluded from the former networks, as eligibility for 
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unemployment and health insurance, maternity leave and employer-sponsored 
pensions is contingent upon full-time formal employment. This implies that for 
many women, informal networks are essential for the provision of social 
security (Kasente 1998). An examination of the 2003 Labour Force Survey 
reveals the extent to which this holds in South Africa: while structural deficits in 
the economy mean that unemployment rates are high for all groups, the rate for 
women is consistently higher than that for men across all races (for blacks the 
official (strict) rate of unemployment is 37.4 percent as against 30.4 percent), 
while among those employed, close on 25 percent fewer women work in the 
formal sector. 
Surveys across developing countries suggest that it is women who have a more 
extensive network of community ties and are frequent participants in reciprocal 
relationships that provide essential practical and psychological support. This 
community ‘embededness’ is often attributed to a gendered division of labour 
that assigns responsibility for domestic affairs to women (Molyneux 2002:177-
178). Women, especially in Africa, are more likely to allocate their financial 
resources to servicing collective needs than is the case for men (see evidence 
cited by Anderson and Baland 2002). In the South African context, Duflo (2000) 
finds that state pensions have a significant impact on the nutritional status of 
girls when received by a woman in the household, while there is little impact in 
the case of a male recipient. 
South Africa’s welfare system provides means-tested support for the young (the 
child grant), the elderly (the old age pension) and the disabled (the disability 
grant).  No significant income support is provided for adults of working age who 
cannot find employment.  For such individuals, it is possible that informal social 
capital networks have become crucial for survival.  Coleman has shown that 
access to government welfare programmes reduces the dependence of 
individuals on informal structures of social capital (1988: 103).  The converse is 





Informal Group Savings as Social Capital 
A Typology of Stokvels 
Much of the literature on informal savings in South Africa analyses so-called 
stokvel groups. The term is believed to be a corruption of the word ‘stock fair’, 
referring to cattle auctions held during the nineteenth century by English settlers 
in the Eastern Cape. Black farmers and labourers in attendance at these fairs 
would exchange ideas, engage in gambling and sometimes club money together 
to purchase livestock. This gradually evolved into savings schemes organised 
around structured gatherings of small groups of people, who would meet 
regularly at the house of a member to socialise and make payment into a rotating 
fund. The host would receive the sum of these contributions (Schulze 1996:78, 
Verhoef 2001b:523-524).  
As yet there has been no systematic study of the role and functioning of 
stokvels.6 The existing literature is predominantly in the form of case studies, 
and what exactly constitutes a stokvel is open to considerable debate. Despite a 
multiplicity of colloquial understandings, many studies simply invoke a 
definition generalised from the particular kind of stokvels examined or rely on 
Ardener’s (1964) characterisation of rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) – see below. This ad hoc approach makes for somewhat confusing 
reading and reflects a degree of inconsistency between theory and reality – 
‘stokvel’ and ‘informal savings group’ are not synonymous terms.7  While this 
problem of definition stems in part from a genuine absence of clear boundaries 
in operation and function between the various types of groups, it is useful to 
outline five broad stokvel categories. Unless otherwise noted, this discussion 
relates specifically to the South African literature. 
 
                                                 
6 The literature cites a number of alternative names by which stokvels are known, including 
gooi-goois (‘to throw’), kuholisana (‘to draw wages’), mahodisana (‘to pay back to each 
other’) and umgalelo (‘to pour’) (Moodley 1995:362, Thomas 1991:291–292). 
7 For example, Moyo et al adopt an expansive definition of stokvels that encompasses even 
clubs whose members rotate days on which they purchase alcohol for each other (2002:12). 
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Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
In her seminal work on the comparative dynamics of ROSCAs in a number of 
countries, Ardener adopts the following definition: ‘An association formed upon 
a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is 
given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation’ (1964:201).  
In the South African context, payments are made mostly in cash with in-kind 
contributions generally in the form of groceries that are added to the cash pool 
(Verhoef 2001b:534).The magnitude of contributions appears to vary widely. 
Some ROSCAs practice a policy of ‘doubling’, whereby a member may pay 
more than the standard contribution during a given rotation. This is done in 
expectation of reciprocity on the part of the recipient, who is expected to match 
the contributor’s generosity at the appropriate point in the rotation. Such extra 
payments are generally made after careful consideration of the financial 
positions of both members (Bujis 2002:35).  
Interestingly, some authors note a reluctance on the part of ROSCA members to 
take up the first places in the rotation, an unexpected outcome given that those 
who receive the fund first effectively obtain an interest-free loan. This reflects 
two possibilities: some members may wish to persuade their friends to ‘double’, 
while the more risk-averse prefer to have funds available to them throughout the 
year in case of emergency (ibid:37). 
Accumulated Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) 
These groups extend their activities beyond simple savings mobilisation to 
obtain interest on contributions through informal lending or the investment of 
collective capital in a bank account. Returns on the former are considerably 
higher (Coetzee and Cross (2001) report interest charges in excess of 80% p.a.), 
although this partly serves to compensate for the risk of default on these loans. 
Some groups insist that members borrow an amount to be repaid at interest from 
the collected pool. The latter variety means that the ASCA serves as both a 
credit and banking facility for members (Burman and Lembete 1995:36).  
Interest earned is either divided, or set aside to deal with emergencies (Moodley 
1995:363). ACSAs may also act as ‘investment clubs’, banking the collected 
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pool until an amount sufficient to purchase an income-generating asset such as 
land or a taxi has accumulated (Schulze 1996:79). Though not explicitly cited in 
the literature, another incentive for groups of this nature may be to minimise 
bank charges and maximise interest received where larger deposits are subject to 
higher rates of interest.  
Burial Societies (Makgotlas) 
Particularly prominent among stokvels that purport to mobilise savings for a 
specific purpose is the burial society or makgotla, which assists households with 
funeral costs. While these organisations serve essentially the same role as 
savings and investment stokvels in providing for a particular life-cycle need (a 
view adopted by Lukhele (1990) and Verhoef (2001b)), their specificity of 
function has translated into separate treatment in some accounts (for example 
Schulze (1996)).  
The high cost associated with customary African funerals leads many 
individuals insure themselves with multiple burial societies (Thomson and Posel 
2002).8 Prominent among the reasons cited for these elaborate ceremonies is the 
need to rest the soul of the deceased, and to appease and show respect for the 
spirits. A traditionally important element of the funeral feast is also a discussion 
among elders and relatives of how the household should be reconstructed and 
the roles of the departed reassigned. A more expensive feast may be seen as 
granting greater import to this meeting (ibid:10-13, Lukhele 1990:17), although 
the extent to which this remains a reality in an increasingly urbanised and 
modernised society is questionable.  
                                                 
8 Roth describes a typical township funeral:  
‘Respondents reported attendance at [prayer] meetings as ranging between 200 
and 600 people. After the prayer meeting, mourners travel to the cemetery in taxis 
paid for by the deceased’s household. At the cemetery, the opulence of the funeral 
is revealed. Some respondents hired red carpets to lead mourners to the gravesite. 
Others bought arches of flowers to mark the path to the gravesite; some had both 
... The gravesite is often adorned with poster-sized photographs of the deceased. 
Frequently a tent is erected beside the graveside for mourners. All respondents 
expressed a desire to be able to purchase the most expensive coffin possible. The 
coffin itself is typically shrouded in wreaths of flowers’ (2000:10). 
This is usually followed by a funeral feast during which several sheep or a cow are 
slaughtered and served as part of a substantial meal to mourners. Additional costs to the 
family include board and lodging for relatives who have traveled long distances and 
occasionally an ‘after tears party’ at which a variety of alcohol is served (ibid:10). 
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Associations generally enforce regular contributions, especially where members 
belong to a formal insurance policy that covers the group as a whole. While this 
mitigates the risk of being unable to meet costs should there be an irregularly 
large number of funerals in a given time, it also removes much of the flexibility 
with regards to payments necessary in a low-income environment with high 
unemployment.  
Where no formal scheme is subscribed to, proceeds are generally banked, and a 
given amount paid out or specific costs met on the death of a member or an 
approved beneficiary.  Most societies appear to allow each member to name 
around ten beneficiaries, who are not restricted to being close family (Thomson 
and Posel 2002:84-87). This aspect of informal burial societies is an important 
accommodation for many black households which extend well beyond the 
nuclear family.  
Entertainment Stokvels 
Many ROSCA-type groups have a social element whereby the recipient of the 
pool is responsible for hosting a gathering that other members pay to attend. 
This appears to have given birth to a new form of stokvel, which has as its focus 
generating rather than saving money. The most elaborate of such gatherings 
involve the printing of invitation cards to notify individuals other than members 
about a stokvel meeting. An entrance fee is charged and food and drinks are sold 
at a profit. Loud music is played to entertain guests and attract passers-by to the 
gathering (Lukhele 1990). The host may generate considerable earnings over 
and above the amount raised by standard stokvel contributions - these groups are 
thus distinct from ROSCAs in that the primary source of income is not savings. 
Group size is generally small to allow each member to act as host at least twice a 
year (Financial Mail 1988:32). In entertainment stokvels, harsh penalties may be 
imposed on members who fail to attend meetings and in extreme cases, 
expulsion may result, as no-shows result in loss of income for the host and 
violate the norm of reciprocity on which these groups are based (Verhoef 
2001b:535). 
However, other references in the literature to such parties are limited, and 
reported social gatherings are considerably tamer than those described by 
Lukhele.  Members and their visitors may make a generous contribution towards 
the food and refreshments provided by the host (generally the recipient of the 
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pot). In lieu of monetary offerings, those in attendance may instead purchase 
useful household items such as crockery or cutlery (Bujis 2002:37, 39). 
Purchasing Power Groups/Cooperative Buying Societies 
The term stokvel may also refer to groups that pool money in order to save 
through bulk purchases, especially of groceries (Lukhele 1990:25-26). While 
such arrangements are frequently cited in casual discussion of stokvels, they are 
all but ignored in the literature, perhaps because their existence presents no 
particular insight into economic or social behaviour beyond the obvious. 
An Overview of Informal Savings Group Logistics 
While elements of social interaction may still be an important component of 
entertainment stokvels and purchasing power groups, it is the specific aim of this 
paper to examine the interplay between the mobilisation of social and financial 
resources. In order to avoid perpetuating the potential confusion associated with 
the use of the term stokvel, the terms ROSCAS, ASCAs and burial societies are 
henceforth described as informal savings groups (ISGs). 
Membership ranges from a handful of people to several hundred, especially in 
the case of investment clubs and larger burial societies. A little over a fifth of 
participants in fieldwork undertaken by Verhoef in Gauteng belonged to ISGs of 
ten members or less, while more than half those surveyed had fewer than twenty 
members in their association (2001b:534). Size is generally determined by the 
logistics of managing the group.  
Depending on literacy levels, savings groups may possess a formal constitution 
outlining rules and procedures. The majority appear to have such a document, 
and a similarly large number keep minutes of proceedings at meetings (Verhoef 
2001b:534, Moodley 1995:364). Where written records are not kept, there is 
generally a strict rule that all members should witness the handing over of 
contributions (Bujis 2002:34). Officials are commonly elected, among which are 
usually a chairperson, secretary and occasionally an organiser who is 
responsible for ensuring smooth running of social events (ibid, Verhoef 
2001b:534) Many also employ some form of sanction for transgressing 
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commonly understood rules, most often fines imposed for late arrival or 
speaking out of turn (Bujis 2002:33-34).  
Stokvels and Surveys 
As noted, existing research on informal savings predominantly takes the form of 
case studies, and while providing an interesting basis for comparison, even 
attempts to integrate these studies cannot provide sound generalisations on the 
characteristics and behaviour of members. Data from broad-based surveys 
provides a potential source for such research, but the formulation of questions in 
these is generally inappropriate for identifying trends in individual savings 
behaviour.  
A significant limitation stems from the failure of surveys to capture varying 
interpretations of the term stokvel and the vastly differing nature of groups that 
categorise themselves under this label. More to the point, presuming that these 
surveys intend to capture people’s participation in informal savings networks, 
the generic stokvel may actually exclude those who do not wish to identify with 
the extravagant parties of entertainment groups. It is thus possible that a 
question probing whether a respondent ‘saves’ in a ‘stokvel’ may be viewed as 
inherently nonsensical. The Khayelitsha-Mitchell’s Plain (KMP 2000) dataset 
provides a clear example of this, using the terms ‘stokvel’ and ‘gooi-gooi’ (a 
generic used to describe ROSCAs and ASCAs) interchangeably (refer to 
Appendix A). While the literature focuses on ISG savings as prevalent among 
blacks, an examination of the KMP data shows ‘stokvel’ savings as far more 
widespread among the coloured than black community. This may likely (though 
not conclusively) be attributed to imprecision of definition.  
Both the October Household Survey (OHS 1999) and the SALDRU Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD 1993) attempt only to 
identify the existence of a ‘stokvel’ saver at the household level (Appendix A). 
Aside from the definitional issue, this essentially makes an examination of 
relationships between individual-level factors and ISG membership impossible.9 
                                                 
9 An additional source of bias may result from the existence of ‘elaborate privacy 
conventions’ adopted to prevent the acquisition of knowledge about household finance 
(Coetzee and Cross 2001). Further, the PSLSD may actually give a distorted picture of debt 
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Table 1: Participation in church and community organisations (% of 
respondents involved in church or community activities) 
 Church groups Community groups 
Burial society members 26.36 22.81 
All other participants 23.31 12.32 
Stokvel members 28.44 20.91 
All other participants 23.93 15.72 
Source: KMP survey (2000). 
However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from the limited existing 
evidence. A cursory examination of black savers in the KMP dataset reveals 
women to predominate, with females constituting close on 70 percent of 
‘stokvel’ and 60 percent of burial society members. Members were also more 
likely to participate in church and community organisations. Support for these 
findings is discussed later in this paper. 
Savings, Poverty and Banking 
 
The great irony of being poor is that you are too poor to save, but too poor not to save. 
- Stuart Rutherford 
In a cross-country analysis of poverty, Rutherford (1999) argues that the poor 
are confronted with the need to spend large amounts on numerous occasions. 
These expenditures may be classified into three categories. The first is life cycle 
needs - those occurrences that can largely be predicted, and in a South African 
context could involve the birth of a child, the payment of lobola (bride-wealth), 
home-building and funeral expenses. This division would also incorporate 
education, the advent of old age and regular festivals such as Christmas. 
Emergencies constitute the second category and necessitate spending as a result 
of unforeseen events. These may be divided into personal emergencies such as 
unemployment, illness or the death of a breadwinner, and impersonal 
emergencies including political unrest, forced removals or floods. Finally, 
certain expenditures may improve quality of life by facilitating the purchase of 
costly consumer durables, or allow individuals the opportunity to purchase 
productive assets or invest in a new business. 
                                                                                                                                                        
by failing to distinguish between stokvels that enforce borrowing by members and stokvels 
who lend for profit.  
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The requisite cash balances are generally obtained through the sale of assets, 
borrowing money (frequently at high rates of interest), or the adoption of some 
mechanism to convert a flow of small and often irregular savings into significant 
amounts (what Rutherford terms ‘basic personal financial intermediation’). It is 
the latter which is the particular concern of this paper, though it should be noted 
that if savings is understood in the conventional sense of income less 
consumption, credit is simply borrowing against future savings. Both serve the 
essential function of providing an individual with an amount in excess of that 
which she could expect to earn beyond subsistence in a short time period. 
Informal Savings in the South African Context 
Various explanations have been proposed to account for the reluctance of black 
savers to utilise formal sector banking instruments. These include racist attitudes 
on the part of predominantly white management under apartheid (Eberson and 
Ryan 1991)10, the image of austerity associated with formal institutions, as well 
as the failure of banks to offer services in the vernacular (Cross 1987). However, 
such arguments do not adequately explain why ten years into democracy ISGs 
are still preferred to banks, or indeed why individuals choose to save 
collectively rather than under the mattress. This is a fundamental shortcoming of 
the existing South African literature on informal savings, which largely points to 
the benefits of participation but neglects to explicitly address why alternative 
instruments are not employed. 
Ardington and Leibbrandt observe that to a large extent ISGs and formal 
financial services are complementary (2004:2), however the datasets used in 
their research do not allow for evaluation of the qualitative aspects of this 
relationship. In light of the possibility that individuals use bank accounts solely 
for transmission, withdrawing most available funds almost immediately 
(Verhoef finds that almost 90 percent of stokvel participants also have a personal 
bank account, but draw on this facility infrequently, with only 2.3 percent using 
an account to earn interest (2001b:537)), there is evidence that individuals 
perceive these networks as having value in excess of their savings function.  
                                                 
10 The authors quote a senior building society executive as saying, ‘Frankly, we don’t want 
the gumboot brigade in our banking halls’ (1991:39). 
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A closer examination may be facilitated by the introduction of a simple model. 
An individual willing to put aside an amount M for n time periods faces the 
following savings options and related payoffs at time n: 
 
1. ‘Hoard’ the money  
 
UH = nM 
 
 
2. Save in an individual bank account  
 
UIS = nM + iIS – CIS         where i refers to interest received and C 
to bank charges  
 
 
3. Save in an ASCA 
 
UAS = nM +  iAS – CAS + SAS iAS > iIS11 and CAS  < CIS  and S is the NET 
social benefit to participation 
 
  
4. Save in a ROSCA with n participants each contributing M, and 
receive the pot in rotation k12:  
 
URS = (1+δ)n-knM + SRS           where δ is a positive constant reflecting 
the individual’s per period discount rate 
(preference for obtaining the pool 
sooner)13 
 
                                                 
11 As noted, interest offered on banked amounts is a positive function of the amount invested, 
while interest rates on informal sector loans are considerably in excess of that offered by 
banks on savings 
12 Exponential discounting is assumed here for simplicity. 
 
13 An alternative to using δ here would be to use the lowest interest rate at which the 
individual could obtain credit (either in the formal or informal sector). However, this 
approach would not give due weight to the importance of the individual’s subjective valuation 
of the money made available to them. 
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If the magnitudes of all right hand side variables are treated as subject to the 
individual saver’s perceptions, it is possible to appreciate the variety of 
processes which may have produced the savings behaviour evident in black 
communities today. 
This simple framework fits well with existing models designed to explain the 
persistence of ROSCAs.14 Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) propose that the 
primary purpose of these groups is to save for the purchase of indivisible 
durable goods where credit markets are inaccessible. In this light, independent 
individual savings would be inefficient, as acquisition of the good would be 
considerably delayed for all members in the rotations (except the last) relative to 
a ROSCA set-up. This is evident from (4) above, where:  
(1+δ)n-knM > nM (for n ≠ k)  
and is supported to some extent by the South African literature which records 
the growth of stokvels as a means to avoid the steep interest rates charged on 
hire purchase goods (Lukhele 1990:25). 
Financial Literacy and Miscalculation of the i and C 
Variables 
There undoubtedly remains a residual undercurrent of mistrust in banks, 
especially high bank charges for services that clients often do not see or 
understand. It is thus possible that savers, whether accurately or not, view bank 
charges as in excess of interest received (iIS < CIS), making individual savings 
the least desirable of the available options. One bank client complained, ‘I think 
we are losing a lot of money by simply banking it’ (Unilever Institute:2003). 
Importantly, the dismantling of discriminatory legislation does not imply a 
concomitant increase in financial literacy. Forty-seven percent of the unbanked 
market does not trust ATMs (ibid), while Thomson and Posel report the 
following error in computing monthly burial society contributions: 
                                                 
14 Much of the existing literature on informal savings relates to ROSCAs. A large part (though 
not all – the Besley, Coate and Loury study serves as a notable exception) may be applied to 




We used to pay R117 [a month]. It is only last year that we paid R87. 
We are supposed to pay R500 for the whole year towards that funeral 
cover, so we realized that paying R117 meant paying more than 
required, so we had to rectify that mistake (2002:109). 
If simple calculations of this nature prove troublesome, it is unlikely that more 
complex concepts such as interest and inflation are adequately understood by 
potential bank patrons, who arguably lack the requisite skills to make informed 
savings decisions. 
The Role of Social Capital in Savings Decisions: the 
S Variable 
In their study of a Kenyan slum, Andersen and Baland suggest that ROSCAs are 
formed as a means for wives to protect their income against immediate 
consumption by their husbands (2002:964-965).15 While this model of 
intrahousehold conflict is the dominant theme of their analysis, they also 
consider the possibility that participation may be viewed as a means for 
relatively wealthier households to resist demand for financial support from less 
wealthy relatives in a socially acceptable manner (ibid:988). Both of these social 
defence mechanisms may ultimately be regarded as a positive product of social 
capital incorporated in the S variable.  
Indeed, apart from monetary need, social support and protection for children or 
family is most commonly cited as a reason for joining an ISG (see, for example, 
Verhoef 2001b:537), and it is largely the accumulation of such social benefits 
that sets formal institutions and informal savings groups apart. A similar set of 
alternatives is faced by those who wish to invest in funeral insurance, and who 
must examine the tradeoffs between the certainty of payouts in formal schemes, 
and the flexibility in payment and social support offered by somewhat more 
risky informal burial societies. Additions to S are accrued through the formation 
of networks of social capital and the associated production and consumption of 
relational goods.  
                                                 
15 Ardener cites a number of studies in which women keep ROSCA participation secret from 
their spouses in developing world settings as diverse as Lebanon and Cameroon (1995:15-16). 
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There is considerable support for this hypothesis. Keswell (2003) cites evidence 
to suggest that membership of a network has a significant positive impact on 
employment prospects. Burman and Lembete find that women participating in 
ISGs were aware of the interest they were forfeiting by not banking their 
savings. They regarded the loss of this income as more than offset by the gain in 
relational goods, such as the opportunity to network with those working in the 
professional sector (1995:42-43). Members also observe the importance of ISGs 
in breaking down social barriers between professionals and those with limited 
formal education (Bujis 2002:40).  
The formation of such networks between women from diverse social 
backgrounds speaks to Putnam’s concept of bridging social capital; however 
bonding social capital is perhaps a more important element of these interactions. 
Involvement in an ISG enforces discipline in savings, and members often 
contrast the ease with which money can be withdrawn from a personal bank 
account against the necessity of fixed monthly ISG contributions that cannot be 
‘withdrawn’ except at predetermined times. Here, the ISG may be seen as an 
important network for the production of another relational good: the motivation 
to work towards a shared collective goal. These binding networks also provide a 
channel for the flow of relational goods such as companionship and a sense of 
belonging. 16 
Indeed, existing studies suggest that membership of ISGs in South Africa is 
deeply embedded in a perceived cultural identity.17 One respondent lamented, 
‘... in banks there is no ubuntu’ (Verhoef 2002:24), and this is perhaps the crux 
of their continued predominance over banks: the ability to reinforce a sense of 
community in an otherwise detached urbanised setting. The South African 
government (1997) explicitly recognises the importance of ubuntu in 
contemporary society:18  
Each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed through his or her 
relationship with others and theirs in turn through a recognition of the 
                                                 
16 Thomson and Posel record a study that reports one interviewee as belonging to ten burial 
societies - he apparently ‘enjoyed going to the meetings for social reasons’ (2002:88). 
17 For a comparative account of the role of culture in an individual’s choice of savings 
instrument, see Carpenter and Jensen’s (2002) study of formal and informal savings 
mechanisms in Pakistan. The authors find literacy and income to be the most important 
influences on instrument choice, but observe that formal banking suffers a number of 
shortcomings in accommodating cultural norms. 
18 However, it is unclear how variable notions of this concept are across groups and location. 
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individual’s humanity. Ubuntu means that people are people through 
other people. 
The act of saving may thus be regarded as having societal value in addition to 
personal benefits. Those with savings are able to support those in need, borrow 
securely and loan money to others if necessary (Verhoef 2002:26). ISG 
participation may thus be understood as an important signal employed by an 
individual to demonstrate that she is fulfilling her moral and cultural obligations. 
While direct monitoring of how payouts are spent is rare, many women’s clubs 
encourage spending directed at improving household well-being (Bujis 
1998:60). Further, ubuntu is central to the principle of reciprocity on which most 
ISGs rely for sustainability. 
Geertz presents an interesting cross-country analysis of ROSCAs, in which he 
argues that these groups should be seen as intermediate institutions of 
development; socialising mechanisms that allow groups to adjust their cultural 
framework to modern or ‘non-traditional’ economic processes. In many lights, 
his perspective appears applicable in explaining the emergence of ISGs in 
rapidly urbanising black communities: 
The rotating credit association … reflects two contrary forces. There 
is a movement toward an increased segregation of economic activities 
from non-economic ones; while at the same time, there is a directly 
contradictory attempt to maintain the dominance of the traditional 
values over those developing economic activities … It is these 
contrary forces that the association is able, at least in many cases, to 
balance in such a way that severe disturbances of social equilibrium 
are avoided, even in a situation of fairly rapid social change 
(1962:260). 
However, South Africa should instead be regarded as a case study to counter this 
proposition: formal financial institutions develop alongside flourishing ISGs, 
which, despite rising levels of education, do not appear to be diminishing in 
importance among most black communities. Indeed, the integration of some 
ISGs into the banking arena through packages specially designed to target group 
savers is a hint that participation yields more than simple economic returns, and 




Gender Bias in the Production of Social Capital 
through ISGs 
The literature on social capital and gender discussed previously anticipates the 
presence of an unbalanced division of membership within ISGs - participants are 
overwhelmingly women (Verhoef 2001a:267). It is argued that their higher 
discount rates make men less successful in informal savings endeavours: there is 
a clear ‘unwillingness [on the part of men] to forego spending available cash for 
future benefits’ (Bujis 2002:31).19  
With high rates of unemployment, men are generally regarded as more mobile 
than women who are integral to the preservation of household structure. The 
ease with which they may ‘escape their debts’ means that men are viewed as less 
desirable ISG members (Bujis 1998:62). This suggests that more mobile 
individuals are unlikely to receive a positive reaction to their attempts to 
integrate themselves into social capital networks, providing an interesting 
variation on Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote’s (2001) view that investment in 
social capital is lower for individuals subject to increased mobility. 
Further, women simply appear to prefer single sex societies: ‘We found women 
to be more responsive than men. Men always want to rule ... Men would bring 
problems or join us for other reasons like eating our money and jolling’ 
(respondent in Thomson and Posel 2002:95-65). Many women stress the 
importance of ROSCA and ASCA payouts as a means to independence from 
‘frequently unreliable or uncooperative men who had fathered their children’ 
(Burman and Lembete 1994:41). This problem is exacerbated by the largely 
inadequate formal social security net available to women. 
Historically, ISGs became central to the survival of black women in adjusting to 
the urban environment and meeting subsistence needs with low and irregular 
incomes. The burden of caring for the family was (and in many cases still is) 
generally perceived as the woman’s responsibility (Verhoef 2001a). A natural 
means by which to generate extra income was through beer-brewing, 
traditionally the domain of African women. The growth of shebeens was 
encouraged by the absence of entertainment alternatives in black areas under the 
                                                 
19 There is considerable cross-country evidence to suggest that women’s savings discipline is 
greater than that of men, for example, it is an empirical fact that women have higher 
repayment rates in group micro-credit projects (see for example Molyneux 2002, Abbinf, 




Group Areas Act. Subject to frequent raids and arrest, black ‘shebeen queens’ 
came to rely increasingly on their ISGs for security when subjected to police 
harassment: 
When a stokvel member was arrested, the others would help with the 
home and children until the member came out of jail. In this way, 
stokvels became more than just organizations for the circulation of 
money and evolved into comprehensive support systems for members 
in times of hardship (Lukhele 1990:7-8). 
The ISG may thus be regarded as a mutual insurance arrangement through 
which individuals create support networks on which to draw during unforeseen 
crises. Aside from the possibility of changing the order of rotation in ROSCA-
type groups to facilitate individual needs, participants appear to operate on a 
system of reciprocity in offering non-pecuniary resources to assist one another 
in times of difficulty.20  
Burial societies present an interesting hybrid of social and financial insurance. In 
examining the burial society as a mutual assistance scheme, Thomson and Posel 
(2002) argue that its effectiveness should be judged not by its financial 
‘soundness’ but rather by the degree of reciprocity between members. When 
shortages arise, rather than folding completely, some burial societies revert to 
‘collection societies’, taking collections as required from members to subsidise 
necessary expenses while attempting to reaccumulate funds. Flexibility in 
payment and the high levels of reciprocity prevalent among members are 
important components of burial societies’ success. 
Accounting for Relational ‘Bads’ 
Despite overwhelming evidence of positive benefits, an individual’s decision to 
join an ISG would require balancing these benefits with a number of 
disincentives to participation. Some reports suggest rivalry between ISGs and 
traditional church groups: 
                                                 
20 Schulze records cases where stokvels pledge mutual support should members suffer 
damages to their house or crops (1996:81); Keswell similarly highlights a number of non-
pecuniary benefits conferred by participation, including mutual assistance with childcare, 
household and agricultural activities (2003:14). 
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‘church people criticise these associations because they become well-
known and better-known than the church, and then people lose their 
interest in the church and become more active in the work of the 
association.’ The problem here may relate to the amount of money 
involved and the feeling among church officials that sums that would 
previously have gone to church funds may now be used to support 
RCAs [rotating credit associations] instead (Bujis 2002:40). 
Where ISG membership is based on church affiliation, this is unlikely to be 
problematic. However, where this is not the case, it is probable that these social 
conflicts have a negative and stressful impact on participants. Such by-products 
of social networks may be viewed as relational ‘bads’. Tensions between 
families and burial societies as to who should adopt a dominant role in 
organising proceedings were also documented by Thomson and Posel: 
‘Sometimes when [the burial society members] come to do their job, 
they get clash with the deceased family ... They fight ... And the burial 
society don’t want the family’s involvement ... We want us to be the 
only ones working. And those clashes can be ugly’ (2002:100). 
Members also expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the manner in which 
burial societies reinforced tendencies among black communities to hold lavish 
funeral ceremonies and feasts beyond their means. Dr Molefe Tsele, General 
Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, observes that funeral 
catering, feasts, luxury caskets and equipment hire are ‘absolutely not African 
tradition’ (Unilever Institute 2003).21 Many families felt the conspicuous 
consumption at funerals was necessary to maintain face – there was concern that 
mourners might ‘gossip if the coffin was an inexpensive one’ (Roth 2000:13). 
The overall impact of the S variable in the above model may also be negative, 
for example where sharing personal financial information is regarded as a social 
                                                 
21 A respondent in Thomson and Posel expresses similar sentiments: 
Respondent:  I don’t know if it comes from the whites or what. And we compete too 
much about who cooks better salads, how were salads in that funeral and 
that funeral. 
Interviewer: What can be done to reduce the costs? 
Respondent: We can adopt the style we had in the olden days. If you die, we must use 





taboo. Further, given that many of the social benefits of ISGs are related to their 
role as insurance mechanisms, the positive component of S may diminish in size 
as an individual’s wealth increases and she is better able to manage negative 
shocks using her own financial resources. The risk of default by a group member 
also detracts from the attractiveness of group saving, as do limitations on 
flexibility in accessing cash once an agreement has been entered into. A 
negative value of S characterises the situation where an individual would choose 
to save individually, despite potentially larger monetary payoffs from ACSA 
participation. 
It is important to re-emphasise that the S variable in the above models refers 
only to the individual’s perceived social benefits and costs; there may be a 
number of externalities to participation. Campbell et al (2002) notes that 
membership of a stokvel is associated with significant sexual health risks: 
members consumed more alcohol, women were more likely to have had a casual 
partner in the last year, while young men exhibited greater probability of being 
HIV positive.22 Further, the inefficiency that accompanies the obligations 
inherent in consumption smoothing arrangements where households are 
compelled to share windfall gains in exchange for social insurance is noted by 
Keswell (2003:25). It is possible that ISG participants may not factor fully into 
the decision-making process alternative and more productive uses of such gains. 
Explaining the Interplay between Social and 
Financial Resources 
Having established that ISGs have both an important financial and social aspect, 
it remains to briefly consider exactly why the interaction of these elements is 
perceived as valuable. Could an individual not just save in a bank and acquire a 
stock of social capital through alternative community activities? In attempting to 
justify this linkage, Ardener observes that within ROSCAs: 
The ‘social’ element ‘sugars the pill’ of crude economic materialism; 
moreover it has practical functions. The money, time and energy spent 
on socializing, far from being ‘wasteful’ or ‘uneconomic’ may be an 
                                                 
22 However, since her sample population was selected from a group consisting 
overwhelmingly of women attracted to the area by the prospect of finding an employed 
boyfriend from the neighbouring mine compound, this link may well be spurious. 
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essential requirement for justifying membership and thus the financial 
viability of the ROSCA (1995:8). 
Further, it is arguable that an individual’s commitment to a regular monetary 
contribution serves as an important screening device in identifying those who 
are genuinely dependable in situations of crisis. A community organisation 
cannot offer such a strong test of trustworthiness: verbal promises are not as 
reliable as active fulfilment of a monthly obligation. This element of 
commitment may well be higher in ROSCAs than ASCAs as a consequence of 
incentives to select members who are less likely to pose moral hazard problems, 
a result which would be reflected through the assignment of a higher value to 
SRS  than SAS .  
Within the South African context, ISGs have been argued to possess cultural 
significance through the perception that participation in some way fulfils the 
moral obligations imposed by the system of ubuntu. A less positive perspective 
may regard their evolution as partly a product of the deficit of social activities 
available to black communities under apartheid. With an established 
equilibrium, it becomes difficult to achieve the same goals through different 
means as a consequence of social inertia. 
A Virtuous Circle: Social Capital and 
Sustainability 
Coleman suggests that ROSCAs are unlikely to operate successfully in urban 
areas as a consequence of the deficit of social organisation and social capital 
(1988:102-103). There may be some substance to this claim: using data from the 
United States, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote have shown the rate of 
investment in social capital to decline with an increase in expected mobility 
(2001:21-22), a characteristic typical of urban life. However, Ardener considers 
the possibility that ROSCAs may act as an important replacement for family ties 
as a consequence of the attenuation of kin networks in urban situations (1995:9). 
The continuing importance of ISGs in South African townships provides support 
for this proposition. 
High savings rates are achieved as a consequence of the peer pressure inherent 
in the ISG system. In her study of a community in Grahamstown, Bujis notes: 
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Participants in Rhini are more inclined to default on their furniture, 
clothing or other hire purchase accounts than on their association 
contribution. This is because the other accounts are private contracts 
between the company and the customer, and are not visible to 
neighbours and friends. By contrast, an individual’s economic and 
social reputation within the community is at stake with regard to 
association payments (1998:62). 
Members are typically selected on the basis of known reliability and affiliation 
with existing members. This is illustrative of the simultaneous use and 
production of social capital networks in forming ISGs. Ebersohn and Ryan 
observe: ‘Only a fool would join a stokvel with people you do not trust ... Deals 
are sealed with a handshake and the knowledge that you can rely on your 
friends’ (1991:37). Occasionally, membership is restricted by demographic 
variables, notably church connections, age (a proxy for ‘respectability’) and 
gender. Using religion as a basis for membership is seen as a means to establish 
shared values (Moodley 1995:364).  
The relationships established over these networks means that to default on an 
ISG payment would be akin to committing social and economic suicide. ‘It’s an 
abomination to default,’ notes Lukhele (Financial Mail 1988: 32). Default rates 
are generally low (see, for example, Verhoef 2001b). Apart from social sanction, 
‘being too poor to borrow can be worse than net indebtedness’ (Cross 1987:88). 
Expulsion from an ISG means that an individual is unlikely to be able to find an 
alternative line of credit, thus preferring to borrow from local moneylenders, 
mashonisas (literally translated, ‘the one who kills’) rather than default on a 
contribution (Financial Mail 1988: 32). 
While the rate of interest here is considerable, it is argued that for many small 
businesses, high interest rates do not pose as severe a problem as the lack of 
credit (Financial Mail 1988:33). Compared with the formal banking sector, 
ISGs are subject to lower overheads and administrative costs. Most importantly, 
their ability to assess with relative accuracy the creditworthiness of loan 
applicants means that they are able to mitigate adverse selection problems and 
are thus well-suited to providing for the credit needs of the informal sector 
(Bujis 1998:57-59).23 
                                                 
23 So as not to idealise the standards of repayment, it is noted that social pressure to pay one’s 
obligations is not always a sufficient incentive. Bujis reports that some associations in larger 
cities are alleged to have their own lawyers, suggesting that as membership size increases, it 
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A View from the Inside: The Bambanani 
Women’s Group 
‘With the gooi-gooi, everything is possible.’ 24 
 
To obtain an independent assessment of the ideas thus far presented in this 
analysis, a focus group was conducted with twelve women who participate in a 
ROSCA-type ISG. Members are all employed as researchers and translators in 
the Khayalitsha community, and were able to expand upon personal experience 
based on insight they had obtained while working. The women were insistent 
that their status as colleagues and as a savings group be separated, noting that 
the principal criteria for membership was ability to contribute the requisite 
monthly sum.25  However, the notable absence of members from outside their 
employment circle suggested that this criterion served as an important filter for 
reliability. 
At the start of the session, the women commented that they regarded ‘stokvel’ as 
describing a shebeen rather than a group of fixed membership,26 and thus 
preferred the term gooi-gooi. That many banks continue to use ‘stokvel’ 
generically to describe ISGs reflected a common theme of the discussion, in 
which formal financial services were portrayed as out of touch with the needs of 
black communities. The women all have a personal bank account but reported 
making little use of this facility due to high bank charges - ‘they are eating our 
money.’ One participant complained, ‘this is called a savings account but at the 
end of the day there is no money … you put in R5000 and when you come back 
you find there is R500.’  
                                                                                                                                                        
becomes easier for individuals to evade their responsibilities (2002:36). The threat of physical 
coercion is also a means to minimise default: ‘One informant's association from time to time 
calls on a certain policeman ... to help recover money owed to them, and this is usually done 
without any paperwork on the part of the police services.’ (Bujis 1998:62) 
24 All quotations in this section reflect comments made by focus group participants 
25 The women did point to the problems inherent in saving with others who were not well-
known, especially the risk of ‘insider robberies’ where members who knew the time and place 
at which the payout would occur would ‘organise skollies to rob the money’ from the 
recipient of the pot. 
26 A possible reason for this association is the historical linkage between stokvels and 
shebeens as described earlier in this paper. 
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However, their response to a thought experiment in which they were asked how 
they would save their money if there no bank charges was enlightening: there 
was a clear consensus that they would still save in a gooi-gooi. Their 
explanation provided considerable support for the theory of these savings groups 
as primarily a means to acquire the cash for ‘lumpy’ durables. On receiving the 
pot, ‘you know you can do something important about that money’. Among the 
most commonly cited uses for the accumulated sum was the purchase of 
furniture and house-building. ‘You can take that money straight to the builders,’ 
reported one respondent who claimed she would otherwise struggle to obtain the 
requisite cash: ‘you would have to save forever.’  
When asked their opinion on why ROSCA-type groups are more common in 
developing than developed world settings, the idea that ‘rich people’ are more 
capable of providing for their families and dealing with misfortune emerged as 
participants’ dominant response. The flexibility accorded to members in 
adjusting the order of rotation depending on need corresponds to Keswell’s 
(2003) view of the stokvel as an insurance mechanism to assist households with 
consumption smoothing. 
The benefits of relational goods produced as a consequence of the formation of 
this network were also highlighted. Sharing the common goal of savings 
discipline, providing mutual support, and the development of friendships over 
time were all cited as reasons for participation. ‘It brings so much,’ commented 
one of the women.  
No restrictions are imposed on how payouts are spent, although it is possible 
that there is some subconscious pressure to act responsibly. One participant 
expressed the wish ‘that they can spend that money wisely.’ Given the 
traditional importance of the Eastern Cape in Xhosa culture, the emphasis placed 
on visiting relations and buying land in this area following receipt of gooi-gooi 
savings may point both to the group’s function in consolidating networks of 
bonding social capital by affirming cultural identity, and the manner in which 
such savings allow for the fulfilment of perceived cultural obligations.  
 Within the group, payment was understood to work on a reciprocal basis 
whereby failure to contribute during a particular round would translate into the 
defaulting member receiving a smaller pot at her turn in the rotation. 
Hypothetically, ‘at the end of the day some could just get an envelope with 
nothing.’ However there was a clear ethic of mutual support reflecting aversion 
to this outcome - ‘you must report if you don’t have money so each and every 
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one can help you.’ This appeared to be driven in part by a commitment to 
ensuring that all members received the full financial benefits of participation, as 
well as a wish to assist the defaulting member to avoid potential embarrassment. 
The women did report cases of other gooi-goois that repossess goods from 
members if they are unable to make payment: ‘some they take your TVs, some 
they take your bed, some they take whatever.’  
Negative elements of participation included criticism of gooi-goois by churches 
(‘especially the gospel ones’): ‘if you do the gooi-gooi, they say it’s like Lotto, 
it’s like gambling.’ Whether this reflects a misunderstanding by these churches 
of the functioning of gooi-goois, or rather, as suggested previously, resentment 
of the large cumulative sums that pass through the hands of members rather than 
church coffers is unclear. While noted as a drawback to membership, this 
apparently does not serve as a serious deterrent. The women also highlighted the 
role of burial societies in reinforcing the expense of funeral services: ‘We are 
forgetting about our culture and what it means a long, long time ago. We are 
making a funeral more like a wedding now.’  
Differential approaches to finance by gender emerged as another important 
theme. Women were portrayed as being ‘responsible’ spenders, while:  
men use their money on cigarettes, girlfriends and shebeens. At the 
end of the week ... you will see men having eight beers and that man 
did not even go to his house. But that woman is being paid only R50 a 
day, but you find [her] coming to Shoprite on a Friday and her family 
is having food on the table.  
The notion of a gendered division of social welfare provision was also 
reinforced: ‘the responsibility of the man are more lighter than the woman.’ That 
gooi-goois were predominantly women was attributed to the greater weight they 
gave to ‘budgeting’, with men’s participation in these groups largely limited to 
those with ‘big money - especially taxi drivers.’ 
In light of the Anderson and Baland hypothesis discussed previously, the 
group’s immediate reaction was that many women do keep gooi-gooi 
membership secret from their husbands for fear that the amount saved may be 
appropriated upon payout. Interestingly, this rapidly changed to a defense of 
their respective spouses, suggesting that the relatively low rates of secrecy cited 
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in Keswell’s (2003) study (25 percent) may reflect a similar sense of obligation 
on the part of the women interviewed to protect their husbands’ reputations.  
Conclusion 
Will [ISGs] be the foundation of black capital accumulation in the 
same way that SANLAM mobilised Afrikaner capital in the thirties. 
Will they be absorbed by existing financial institutions which now 
look at them with hungry eyes, waking to the fact that mountains are 
made up of grains of sand? Or will another path emerge from their 
history as people’s institutions? (Stanford 1991:35) 
This paper has examined the extent of complementarity between these financial 
and social roles. In so doing, it has sought to build a more realistic view that 
regards the development of social capital as in part an investment in the 
production of relational goods. Implicit in this theory is the suggestion that 
individuals do not form relationships solely to improve their long-run financial 
position, with companionship and consolidation of a sense of personal identity 
being significant incentives to participation in groups. The persistence of ISGs 
despite the availability of formal sector financial services, while in part a 
consequence of the failure of banks to adequately address the needs of the poor 
in South Africa, reflects the importance of these groups as informal social 
insurance networks. In particular, this suggests a serious deficit in the 
availability of formal social security for women.  
The perspective developed here should be seen as congruent to existing theories 
rather than as an alternative. Further analysis of ISGs requires that existing 
broad-based surveys be redesigned with greater sensitivity to definitional issues 
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Appendix A: Extracts relating to stokvels from 
surveys 
 
1. October Household Survey (1999) 
 
What was the total household income in the last month, including wage, 
salaries, government grants, private pensions and all other sources of income? 
 Savings account  
 Stokvel savings  
 Pension savings  
 Unit trust  
 Cash loans  
 Life insurance  
 Other savings  
 
Does this household, or a household member, own any of the following 
financial assets? 
 Family member  
 Neighbour  
 Cooperative  
 Bank  
 Land Bank  
 Government agency  
 Stokvel  
 NGO  
 Money lender  
 Farmer  




2. Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development  
(SALDRU 1993) 
 
Interviewer: Ask all households to provide a summary of expenditure in the 
food and non-food categories listed in the grid below. 
 
 How much did the 
household spend in 
the last month? 
How much is 
usually spent in 
a month? 
How much was 
spent in the last 
month? 
 Groceries (including 
toiletries and household 
essentials) 
 Food eaten out 
 Holidays 
 Cars and other vehicles 
(including hire purchases 
and lease agreements) 
 Furniture, including hire 
purchase agreements 
 Clothing 
 Payments to domestic 
servants and gardeners 
 Insurance (including life, 
short-term and funeral 
policies) 
 Savings (including 
retirement annuities and 
stokvel contributions) 
   
 
Interviewer: Introduce by saying: "I am going to read through a list of 
possible lenders. As I read through the list, please indicate whether or not 
money is owed to that source."  
 
 Is anything owed to 
________________? 
 
How much is owed 
to _____? 
 
What is the monthly 
payment? 
 
Stokvel/Credit Union  
 







3. Khayelitsha-Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000) 
 
Do you give money to a stokvel (or gooi-gooi) each month?   Yes
    No  





Appendix B: Areas examined during focus 
group 
 






o Are they all the same thing? How much variation is there within each 
type (for example, do you consider a group that collects R50 from 
each member to be the same “kind” of club as a group that collects 
R5000 from each member?) 
o How are they different (presumably some are simply terms used by 
those who speak different languages)? What is their primary purpose – 
social or economic? 
o Which would you think most people participate in?  
o What kind of social activities are associated with each? Do non-
members ever attend these gatherings? How do the finances of the 
social aspects operate? 
o What “type” of person do you think would typically be a member of 
each if you see them as different (typical characteristics, such as 
marital status, age, no. children, gender, religious affiliations and more 
“personal” attributes like adherence to traditional values, “image’ 
consciousness, aversion to risk etc.)? 
o How do religious people respond to the various types of stokvels? I 
have read that there is sometimes some rivalry between stokvels and 
church groups. Have you ever seen evidence of this? If so, why do you 
think this is? 
o Which would (do) you participate in? Why? 
 
 The logistics  
o How many people are part of your stokvel? How did you choose 
them? Would you let any new members in (how rigid is membership)? 
Why (not)? 
o How much do you contribute and how often? 
o How do you decide who gets the money (order of rotation)? 
o Does your stokvel lend money to members?  
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o Does your stokvel lend money to other people? If so, how does this 
work (amounts, checking credit, interest rates, etc.)? 
o What do people who borrow money from stokvels mostly use it for? 
o Does anybody have special positions (eg. treasurer, secretary, 
president)? If so, how did you decide who would hold these positions. 
o Do you have a written constitution/agreement? 
o Do you keep written records of payments/contributions? 
o Do you have any fines (eg. for people who don’t attend meetings?) 
 
 Why do you save in a stokvel and not a bank/Post Office/by yourself? 
o If your reasons are social … surely there are other forms of social 
interaction. Why do you choose to mix money and pleasure? 
o Some researchers say that people save in stokvels because there is a 
sense of “ubuntu” in how money is handled in these groups. Do you 
think this is true? 
o Do you realize that you can earn interest if you put your money in the 
bank. 
If so, what makes the stokvel worth sacrificing this? 
o Do you think most stokvel savers are aware of the interest they are 
losing? If so, why are they prepared to lose out? 
o If you could choose your position in the rotation (i.e. when you collect 
the group sum), which spot would you choose and why?  
o Do you think most people understand that R20 today will buy less 
than R20 in one year’s time?  
o Do you personally (on an individual level) use a bank at all? 
o Do you think that if people understood banks better they would be 
more likely to save in a personal account rather than join a stokvel (or 
do they serve different purposes)? 
o Would you always choose to save in a stokvel? Are there any 
circumstances under which you might choose a different form of 
savings? Attempt to examine the link between income and stokvel 
savings. 
 
 Do you think that in general women or men are better savers (or are they 
both the same)? Why? Explore the link that women are ultimately more 
“responsible” for household welfare and thus face more constraints on how 
their money must be spent. 
o Is there a difference between how men and women spend their money 
in general? If yes, why do you think this is? 
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o Do men and women participate in stokvels for the same reasons (this 
may be closely linked with the above expenditure question!)? 
o Do some women keep their participation in a stokvel secret? If so, why 
(fear that their partners may appropriate the money, or possibility their 
efforts may be scorned)? 
 
 Why do you think people need to/want to save? 
o What do you think most people use their savings for? 
 
 There have been some studies that show that many women think that being 
part of a stokvel is “essential” to their survival  
o Do you feel this is the case for you? Why (not?) 
o  If NOT: why do you think these women say this … is it a weak 
understanding of what they are saying on the part of the researcher … 
or do you think some stokvel members genuinely feel this way?  
 
 What kind of problems do stokvels face? 
o Is it risky to save in a stokvel? 
o Have you heard of any cases where people have defaulted on 
payments? What happens? 
o Is there ever any threat of physical intimidation to pay, or is pressure 
mainly applied through social sanction? 
o Do you think those who receive the payout at a given stokvel meeting 
might be more susceptible to being robbed? Have you heard of cases 
like this? 
 
 Do you think stokvels will be around in the future? Should they be around in 
the future? Are stokvels valuable? Why? 
o Is there anything you think the government should be doing to help 
stokvels to flourish? 
 
 Why do you think there are no informal savings groups like stokvels in 
America or England? 
 
 What about burial societies?  
o Are you a member of a burial society. Why (not)? 
o How many people do you think are members of burial societies? 
o Do you think most members are men or women? If you think there is 
a difference, why might this be? 
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o Why do people join (is it simply to save money for a funeral or is 
there substantial social pressure … or is it genuine a social support 
base)? 
o How do you feel about the elaborate funerals that are held for people? 
Do they follow tradition … or are they a more modern interpretation 
of customary last rites? 
o Why are funerals so elaborate? 
o What role do burial societies usually play at funerals? 
o Do you think this is a positive role? Or do they exert too much 
influence? 
The Centre for Social Science Research 
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